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SOME POST-BAKKE-AND-WEBER REFLECTIONS ON
"REVERSE DISCRIMINATION"
Henry J. Abraham*
So much has been said, written, and emoted concerning the subject of "reverse discrimination" that it represents a veritably frustrating experience to endeavor to come to grips with it in a nonredundant, non-banal, non-breast-beating manner. The difficulty is
compounded by the all-too pervasive substitution of passion for
reason on the wrenching issue-one that, admittedly, invites passion. Indeed, passion informed not an insignificant number of the
record filings of the 120 briefs amicii curiae in the first central
"reverse discrimination" case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,I in which oral argument was presented to the Supreme Court of the United States in mid-October 1977. It took place
in a sardine-like packed Court chamber, with more than 200 putative spectators waiting in line all night in the hope of perhaps hearing one three-minute segment of that potential bellweather decision-toward which the Court, in an unusual action, called for the
filing of supplementary briefs by all parties concerned two weeks
later in order to argue specifically the statutory question(s) involved
in the application of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Passion
similarly governed the denouement of the second major "reverse
discrimination" case, United Steel Workers and KaiserAluminum
& Chemical Corporationv. Weber,2 which the Court decided in June
1979, almost exactly one year after the Bakke holding. And passion,
however comprehensible emotionally, has clouded the arguments
and contentions of even the most cerebral professional as well as lay
observers of the "reverse discrimination" issue, the resolution of
which may well constitute a watershed in this particularly crucial
aspect of the race syndrome, of what Gunnar Myrdal more than'3
three decades ago so pointedly titled "The American Dilemma."
* James Hart Professor, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs,
University of Virginia; A.B., Kenyon College, 1948; M.A., Columbia University, 1949; Ph.D.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1952; L.H.D., Kenyon College, 1972.
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
3. G. MYRDAL, AN ARmERCAN DauEMMA (1944).
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In the hope of avoiding an abject surrender to the aforementioned
passion(s), I shall do my best to discuss the matter in a rational
manner while pledging to strive to eschew what Headmaster Stanley Bosworth of St. Ann's Episcopal School in Brooklyn so tellingly,
if perhaps a mite expansively, identified as the "[p]iety, puritanism and guilt [that have] combine[d] to stir the worst semantic
confusion" conceivable 4 in this emotion-charged policy spectrum. It
would thus be helpful to try to identify at the outset what we are,
or should be, talking about in any attempted analysis of the constellation of "reverse discrimination," and what we should not be talking about. To do that it is necessary to find what the concept means.
"I only want to know what the words mean," once commented Mr.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the judicial philosopher of our
age, but he freely admitted, with E. M. Forster, that there is "wine
in words."' A lot of wine and other rather less consumable liquids
have been poured into the notion, into the alleged meaning, of
"reverse discrimination."
II.

Stipulating the audience of these ruminations to be educated,
intelligent human beings, who read, see and/or hear the news that
informs our vie quotidienne, I am comfortable in assuming a basic
familiarity with the issues involved. I also am aware that, and I
daresay without exception, any reader will have strong feelings on
the matter. So do I. We would'not be human if we did not; while
they operate on a host of levels and are triggered at vastly diverse
moments, we all have consciences. Stipulating these facts, I should
first endeavor to make clear what "reverse discrimination" is not:
(1) It is not action, be it in the governmental or private sector,
designed to remedy the absence of proper and needed educational
preparation or training by special, albeit costly, primary and/or
secondary school level preparatory programs or occupational skill
development, such as "Head Start," "Upward Bound," etc., always
provided that access to these programs is not bottomed on race but
on educational, and/or economic need, be it cerebral or manual. (2)
4. The New York Times, Oct. 29, 1977, at 22, col. 3 (Letters).
5. Interview with Francis Biddle (one-time clerk to Mr. Justice Holmes), Wynnewood, Pa.,
March 10, 1962.
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It is not the utilization of special classes or supplemental tutoring
or training, regardless of the costs involved (assuming, of course,
that these have been properly authorized and appropriated) on any
level of the educational or training process, from the very prenursery school bottom to the very top of the professional training
ladder. (3) It is of course not the scrupulous exhortation and enforcement of absolute standards of non-discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, religion, nationality, and also now, to a limited extent,
age. (4) It is not the above-the-table special recruiting and utilization efforts which, pace poo-pooing by leaders of some of the recipient groups involved, are not only pressed vigorously, but have been
and are being pushed and pressed on a scale that would make a Bear
Bryant and Knute Rockne smile a knowing smile. (5) It is not even
an admission or personnel officer's judgment that, along with sundry other criteria, he or she may take into account an individual
applicant's racial, religious, gender, or other characteristics as a
"plus"-to use Mr. Justice Powell's Bakke term-but only if that
applicant can demonstrate the presence of demonstrable explicit or
implicit merit in terms of ability and/or genuine promise. For I shall
again and again insist that the overriding criterion, the central consideration, must in the final analysis be present or arguably potential merit. It must thus be merit and ability, not necessarily based
exclusively upon past performance, but upon a mature, experienced
judgment that merit and ability are in effect in the total picture
either by their presence or by their fairly confident predictability.
These five "nots," which are all aspects of the concept of
"affirmative action"-are naturally not an exhaustive enumeration.
Yet they are illustrative of common practices that, in my view, do
not constitute "reverse discrimination"-always provided that they
remain appropriately canalized within proper legal and constitutional bounds-for they give life to the basic American right of
equality of opportunity. One of the major problems, alas, is that
militant pro-"reverse discrimination" advocates insist on substituting a requirement of equality of result for the requirement of equality of opportunity-arequirement based on the dangerous notion of
statistical group parity, in which the focal point becomes the group
rather than the individual.
This brings me to the necessary look at a quintet of what "reverse
discrimination" is: (1) It is, above all, what in the final analysis, the

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:373

Bakke and Weber cases fundamentally were all about, namely the
setting aside of quotas-be they rigid or quasi-rigid-i.e., the adoption of a numerus clausus, on behalf of the admission or recruitment
or training or employment or promotion of groups identified and
classified by racial, sexual, religious, age, or nationality characteristics. For these are characteristics that are, or should be, proscribed
on both legal and constitutional grounds, because they are nonsequiturs on the fronts of individual merit and ability and are, or
certainly should be, regarded as being an insult to the dignity and
intelligence of the quota recipients. "Our Constitution is colorblind," thundered Mr. Justice John Marshall Harlan in lonely dissent in the famous, or infamous, case of Plessy v. Fergusonin 1896,
"and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." ' His dissent, which became the guiding star of the Court's unanimous holding in the monumental and seminal 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka,7 now prompts us to ask the question
whether, as the proponents of "reverse discrimination" urge, the
Constitution must be color-conscious in order to be color-blind.8 But
to continue what "reverse discrimination" is, it is (2) the slanting
of what should be neutral, pertinent, and appropriate threshold and
other qualification examinations and/or requirements; doublestandards in grading and rating; double-standards in attendance
and disciplinary requirements. It is (3) the dishonest semanticism
of what are called goals or guidelines, that the bureaucracy has
simply pronounced legal and/or constitutional on the alleged
grounds that they differ from rigid quotas, which admittedly would
be presumably illegal and/or unconstitutional. Fully supported by
Mr. Justice Powell's dismissal of them in the Bakke decision as a
"semantic distinction" which is "beside the point,"' I submit that
this distinction is as unworkable as it is dishonest-in the absence
of, to use a favorite Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Department of Labor, and O.E.E.O. term, "good faith" vis-a-vis the
far-reaching efforts of affected educational institutions and employers to function under the concept of "goals" or "guidelines." But
6. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. See Mr. Chief Justice Hale's dissenting opinion in De Funis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash.2d
11, 507 P.2d 1169, 1189 (1973).
9. 438 U.S. at 289.
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while going to enormous length to deny any equation of "goals" or
"guidelines" with "quotas," the largely unchecked enforcement personnel of the three aforementioned powerful and well-funded agencies of the federal government-personnel that, certainly in the
realm of the administration of higher education, often lacks the
one-would-think essential experience and background-in effect
require quotas while talking "goals" or "guidelines." Indeed, within
hours, if not minutes, of the Bakke decision, for example, Eleanor
Holmes Norton, the aggressive head of the O.E.E.O., announced
that the Supreme Court holding would make no difference, whatever, to "the work we have been doing."1 Thus, there is extant an
eager presumption of a lack of a good faith effort against the
background-imposition of rigid compliance quotas, based upon frequently irrelevant group statistics, statistics that are demonstrably
declared to be ultra vires by Title VII, Sec. 703(j) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.11 (4) Reverse discrimination is such a statutory provision-one recently challenged and declared unconstitutional by U.S. District Court Judge A. Andrew Hauk, 12 but also
upheld by U.S. District Court Judge Daniel J. Snyder, Jr., 3 who
was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit" 4-as that mandated under the Public Works Employment
Act of 1977.15 Under that Act, Congress enacted a rigid requirement
that 10 per cent of all public works contracts designed to stimulate
employment go to minority business enterprises. How does this law
identify such enterprises? They are, according to its terms, private
businesses that are at least half-owned by members of a minority
group or publicly held businesses in which minority group members
control a majority of the stock.1" And who are these statutorily recognized minorities? They are, says the Act, blacks, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts, and what is termed the "Spanish-speaking.""
At issue, in what has quickly come to be known as the "1977 Ten
Per Cent Set-Aside Quota Law," are thousands of construction jobs
10. Newsweek, July 10, 1978, p. 29.

11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976).
12. Associated Gen'l Contractors of Cal. v. Secretary of Commerce of the United States
Dept. of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
13. Constructors Ass'n. of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936 (W.D. Pa. 1977).

14. Constructors Ass'n. of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1978).
15. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6705(0(2) (Supp. 1979).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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and billions of dollars worth of Government contracts. But when the
U.S. Supreme Court initially had the case before it a few days after
the Bakke decision came down, it ducked the problem on the ground
that the award involved had already been consummated and the
money expended, the issue thus being moot.1 8 However, the Court
has since agreed to reexamine it with its docketing of the potentially
seminal case of Fullilove v. Kreps,1 1 for which oral argument was
heard on November 27, 1979. And reverse discrimination is (5) the
widely advanced notion, a favorite of officials at the very highest
levels of all branches of our contemporary Administration that,
somehow, two wrongs make a right; that the children must pay for
the sins of their fathers by self-destructive actions; that, in the
words of Mr. Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in the proreverse discrimination Franks decision in 1976, of "robbing Peter to
pay Paul."2
III.

It is, of course, the latter issue-one I have suggested as my fifth
illustration of what "reverse discrimination" is-that lies at the
heart of the matter. To put it simply, but not oversimplifiedly, it is
the desire, the perceived duty, the moral imperative, of compensating for the grievous and shameful history of racial and collateral
discrimination in America's past. Discrimination is a fact of history
which no fair person can deny, and whose reappearance no decent
or fair person would sanction, let alone welcome. America's record
since the end of World War II, and especially since the Brown decision, is a living testament to the far-reaching, indeed exhilarating,
ameliorations that have taken place, and are continuing to take
place, on the civil rights front. This is a fact of life amply documented and progressively demonstrated, and I need not do so here. '
Anyone who denies the very real progress cum atonement that has
18. Kreps v. Associated Gen'l Contractors of Cal., 438 U.S. 909 (1978).
19. Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2403 (1979).
20. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 781 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
21. I have tried to document this record in my book H. ABAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE CoUr
(3d ed. 1977), now in its third edition, which-ironically in view of my stance on "reverse
discrimination"-encountered difficulties in certain parts of the country as recently as a
decade or so ago because of its allegedly excessive liberality on the race issue. I presume it
all depends, to utilize Al Smith's felicitous phrase, "whose ox is being gored"-and at which
moment in history.
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taken place, and is continuing to take place, in both the public and
the private sector, is either a fool, dishonest, or does so for political
purposes-and the largest numbers fall into that latter category.
American society today is absolutely committed to the fullest measure of egalitarianism under our Constitution, mandated in our
basic document by the "due process" clause of amendments five
and fourteen and the latter's "equal protection of the laws" clause
as well as in a plethora of legislation. But that Constitution, in the
very same amendments, safeguards liberty as well as equality-a
somber reminder that rights and privileges are not one-dimensional.
It is on the frontiers of that line between equality and liberty that
so much of the "reverse discrimination" controversy, both in its
public and private manifestations, has become embattled. It is here
that the insistent, often strident, calls for compensatory, preferential, "reverse discrimination" action are issued-and, more often
than not, they issue from a frighteningly profound guilt complex, a
guilt complex that has become so- pervasive as to brush aside as
irrelevant on the altar of atonement even constitutional, let alone
legal, barriers-witness, for example, the opinions by Justices Brennan and Blackmun in both the Bakke12 and Weber" rulings. To cite
just one or two cases in point: One argument that veritably laces the
pro-"reverse discrimination" positions of the briefs 4 in Bakke and
Weber, especially those by the American Civil Liberties Union, the
Association of American University Professors, Harvard University,
Stanford University, the University of Pennsylvania, Columbia
University, and the NAACP, among others, is that the injustices of
the past justify, indeed demand, a "temporary use of affirmative
action including class-based hiring preferences and admission
goals" in favor of racial minorities.2 In other words, the record of
the past creates the catalyst cum mandate for the imposition of
quotas like the 16 places out of 100 admittedly set aside by the
22. 438 U.S. at 402 (separate opinion of Blackmun, J.).

23. 99 S. Ct. at 2721 (Brennan, J. delivered the opinion of the Court); 99 S. Ct. at 2730
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
24. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae brief for The American Association of University Professors,
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25. Amicus Curiae brief of Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University,

and the University of Pennsylvania, June 7, 1977, p.X, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978).

380

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:373

Medical School of the University of California at Davis for the

"special" admission of members of certain minority groups." What
the school did is entirely straightforward and clear: it did establish
a quota; it did practice discrimination; it did deny admission to a
fully qualified white applicant, Allan Bakke, on racial
grounds-which, as Mr. Justice Steven's stern opinion for himself
and his colleagues Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist, makes clear, is
clearly forbidden by the plain language of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.2 The University had justified its action on the
grounds of redress for past racial discrimination (the University,
incidentally, had never practiced discrimination-and had never
been accused of such until it denied Allan Bakke's admission); 2 on
the need for compensatory action; and a commitment to "genuine
equal opportunity. 29 In the responsive, apposite words of a widelydistributed statement by the Committee on Academic Nondiscrimination and Integrity:
o
Just as no one truly dedicated to civil liberties would contemplate a
"temporary" suspension of, say, the right to counsel or the right to a
fair trial as a means of dealing with a crime wave, so no one truly
dedicated to equality of opportunity should contemplate a
"temporary" suspension of equal rights of individuals in order to
achieve the goal of greater representation. The temporary all too
often becomes the permanent. It is not the ultimate ends we proclaim
3
but the temporary means we use which determine the actual future. 1
In Weber, the central issue was a similar type of quota arrangement, although it governed employment rather than education: the
Steelworkers and the Kaiser Corporation, under pressure by government agencies to engage in "affirmative action," had devised a plan
that "reserves for black employees 50% of the openings in an inplant craft training program until the percentage of black craft
workers in the plant is commensurate with the percentage of blacks
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

438 U.S. at 275.
438 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
438 U.S. at 305.
Brief for Petitioner at 32, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
45 Measure 1 (December 1977).
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in the local labor force." 3 ' Both the U.S. District Court 32 and the
U.S. Court of Appeals33 had ruled that the plan clearly violated Title
VII, Sec. 703, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which specifically
outlaws racial discrimination in employment because of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 34 But while admitting the
presence of the plain statutory proscription, Mr. Justice Brennan in
effect sanctioned its violation on the basis of the spirit of the law
rather than its letter. 5
A related, although somewhat different justification advanced on
the altar of redressing past wrongs by temporarily-or perhaps not
so temporarily?-winking at legal and constitutional barriers, one I
prefer to call the "I am not really pregnant, just a little bit," approach to the problem, is illustrated by Ronald Dworkin, Professor
of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, in his following 1977 defense
of the use of racial criteria in connection with the well-known 1974
Washington Law School "reverse discrimination" case of De Funis
v. Odegaard:6
Racial criteria are not necessarily the right standards for deciding
which applicants should be accepted by law schools for example. But
neither are intellectual criteria, nor indeed, any other set of criteria.
The fairnes§-and constitutionality-of any admissions program
must be tested in the same way. It is justified if it serves a proper
policy that respects the right of all members of the community to be
treated as equals, but not otherwise .... We must take care not to

use the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause
of the Fourteenth
37
Amendment to cheat ourselves of equality.

Which, df course, is exactly what he in effect counsels here-in
addition to the inequality of "reverse discrimination." In other
words, the desired end justifies the means-no matter what the
Constitution may command. We have here another patent illustra99 S.Ct. at 2724.
415 F. Supp. 761 (E. D. La. 1976).
563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(d), and 2000e-2(j) (1976).
99 S.Ct. at 2726-27.
416 U.S. 312 (1974).
37. Dworkin, Defunis v. Sweatt, in EQUALITY AND PREnERENTAL TREATmNT (M. Cohen, T.
Nagel, and T. Scanlon eds. 1977).
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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tion of the guilt complex syndrome which, not content with equal
justice under law and equality of opportunity, insists upon, in Harvard Law Professor Raoul Berger's characterization, the attainment
of "justice cost what it may."38 Yet it represents the gravamen of
the concurring opinions in Bakke by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun; the controlling holding in the Weber case via the
pen of Mr. Justice Brennan; and that of the concurring opinion
therein by his colleague Blackmun.
Along with a good many others who consider themselves bona fide
civil libertarians and are certifiable champions of civil rights, who
decades ago fought the good fight for equal justice and nondiscrimination-when fighting it was far more fraught with professional and personal risks than it is now-I confess, however, that I
do not have a guilt complex on that issue. Myself a sometime victim
of discrimination, of prejudice, and of the numerus clausus, i.e., of
quotas, I know that two wrongs do not one right make; that any socalled "temporary suspension" of constitutional rights is a cancer
upon constitutionalism; that there is no such thing as being a little
bit pregnant. Because of our religious persuasion my parental family
and I were exiled from, and a number of members of our family were
exterminated by, a land where our ancestors had lived for 500 years.
As relatively recently as 1952, I was told by an administrator at a
major northern university-one of the first proudly to carry the antiAllan Bakke banner twenty-five years later-that I could not be
promoted then because "we have already promoted one Jew this
year." To which he added, and he was wholly sincere, "no personal
offense meant." Happily, those times are gone-and I, for one, will
not support their return on the altar of siren-like calls for atonement
for past wrongs, etched in socio-constitutional rationalizations and
manifestations of preferential treatment, compensatory standards,
and quotas that are based on criteria and considerations other than
those of fundamental merit, of ability, of equality of opportunity,
and of equality before the law.
IV.
There is one other matter cum issue that must be addressed as a
38. "The Imperial Court," The New York Times Magazine, October 9, 1977, p.115.
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complement to my exhortation of the legal process, the necessity of
playing the proverbial judicio-governmental societal game according to its rules. That, of course, is the role of the judiciary in interpreting the Constitution and the laws passed (and executive actions
taken) under its constellation. The line between judicial "judging"
and "lawmaking" is of course an extremely delicate and vexatious
one: what represents "judicial activism" to some represents
"judicial restraint" to others, and vice versa. All too often an observer's judgments correspond to the answer to the question "whose
ox is gored?" Jurists are human, as we all are, yet they, unlike
laymen, are presumed to be professionally qualified to render objective judgment-on the meaning, range, and extent of constitutionally
and statutorily sanctioned or interdicted governmental authority
and exercise of power. To be sure, in Mr. Justice Cardozo's memorable phrase from his seminal The Nature of the JudicialProcess, "it
is not easy to stand aloof" when one deals with so controversial a
policy matter as the resort to discrimination as a cure for discrimination, for, as that great jurist and sensitive human being put it so
poignantly, "[t]he great tides and currents which engulf the rest
of men, do not . . . pass [even] the judges idly by." 9 And they
assuredly have not done so-notwithstanding what would appear to
be some crystal clear statutory, and some relatively clear constitutional, commands. Au contraire, these commands have served jurists as well as legislators and mere citizens as justifications and/or
rationalizations along the pathways of coming to grips with the issue
in settling fashion in either political, or socio-economic, or philosophical, or statutory, or, in the final analysis, judicially constructed terms.
But there are demonstrable limits to subjectivity and result orientation, even when these are viewed against the notion of an obligation to heed, as Mr. Justice Holmes put it, "the felt necessities of
the time."4 One of these limits is the ascertainable intent of lawmakers in enacting legislation. De minimis, courts have an absolute
basic obligation to examine statutory language and legislative
intent as evidenced by the printed record-and the "reverse discrimination" field is no exception. Admittedly, the constitutional
39. B. CARDozo, THE NATURE
40. 0. HoLMES, THE COMMON

OF THE JUDICAL PocEss at
LAW at 1 (1881).

168 (1921).
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ground is considerably less clear: for the very verbiage and concept
of "equal protection" (and, for that matter, "due process of law")
defy finite or categorical definition-regrettably all-too-often depending upon the eye of the beholder or the subject and object of
the aforementioned ox-goring. Yet even on constitutional qua constitutional grounds it is difficult to deny the verity of Mr. Justice
Powell's point in his majority opinion in the 1978 Bakke case when
he noted that: "The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one
thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same
protection, then it is not equal.""
Be that as it may, one who attempts to be a dispassionate commentator need not reach, as in effect the Court customarily tried
very hard not to reach, the constitutional issue (here the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection of the laws clause). For if words
mean anything, the basic statute involved, namely the 1964 Civil
Rights Act's Title VII,42 would indeed seem to be crystal clear in
proscribingthe kind of racial quotas that the United States District
Court4 3 and the United States Circuit Court" found to have violated
Brian Weber's rights, for example, but which, on appeal, the highest
court of the land upheld in its 5 to 2 decision." The controlling
opinion, written by Mr. Justice Brennan, acknowledged the statutory, the linguistic command, but he and his four supporters found
approbative warrant in the law's "spirit" rather than in its letter."
For the law's section 703(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to
classify his employees "in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely effect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 47 And, perhaps
even more tellingly, section 703(j) provides that the Act's language
is not to be interpreted "to require any employer . . . to grant
preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of
41. 438 U.S. at 289-90.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (1976).
43. 415 F. Supp. 761.
44. 563 F.2d 216.
45. 99 S. Ct. 2721.
46. Id. at 2726-27.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976).
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of such individual or group" to correct a racial imbal-

.

ance in the employer's work force." Further to buttress historical
and factual documentation on statutory grounds that the authors of
the Civil Rights Act were demonstrably opposed to racial quotas,
one need only take a glance at the voluminous, indeed repeated,
documentation to that extent in the Congressional Record during
the debates that led to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Thus, the latter's successful Senate floor leader, Senator Hubert
Humphrey (D.-Minn.), in responding to concerns voiced by doubting colleagues, vigorously and consistently gave assurance that no
racial quotas or 'racial work force statistics would be employable
under the law. In one exchange with his colleague Willis Robertson
(D.-Va.), he made the following offer: "If the Senator can find in
Title VII.

.

. any language which provides that an employer will

have to hire on the basis of percentage or quota related to color...
I will start eating the pages one after another, because it is not in
there."49
It is difficult, indeed, it is in fact impossible, to argue with the
facts of the statute's language or with congressional intent. Mr.
Justice Brennan's opinion attempted to vitiate those facts by (1)
seizing upon the allegation that the joint Steelworkers-Kaiser Corporation agreement to hire one black for every white trainee was not
required but was voluntary;0 and (2) that, in any event, the program would expire upon reaching statistical workforce-by-race
availability-in-the-community parity." One need not embrace the
angry and sarcastic language of Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion to support his documented contentions that, as to (1) anyone with any knowledge of the course of affirmative action programs
knows that they are patently Government-required;2 and that, as
to (2), subsection (j) of Section 703-quoted above-(a) forbids such
a program and (b) the notion that it would prove to be "temporary"
is either naive or "Houdini-like. 5 3 Whatever one's personal views
on the underlying issue, whatever one's sympathies, the Rehnquist
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976).
110 CONG. REc. 7420 (1964).
99 S. Ct. at 2726.
Id. at 2730.
99 S. Ct. at 2736 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2749.
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dissent, as Professor Philip B. Kurland of the University of Chicago
School of Law put it, is simply unanswerable in terms of statutory
construction and congressional intent. "
To a very considerable degree it was not the Rehnquist dissent,
but that by Mr. Chief Justice Burger, which comes to the heart of
the matter if one wishes to abide by the imperatives of the governmental framework under which we live. For he points to the salient
fact that:
The Court reaches a result I would be inclined to vote for were I a
member of Congress considering a proposed amendment of Title VII.
I cannot join the Court's judgment, however, because it is contrary
to the explicit language of the statute and arrived at by means wholly
incompatible with long-established principles of separation of powers. Under the guise of statutory "construction," the Court effectively
rewrites Title VII to achieve what it regards as a desirable result. It
"amends" the statute to do precisely what both its sponsors and its
opponents agreed the statute was not intended to do. 5
There is no response to the Chief Justice's admonition-for it
assesses accurately the obligations accruing under our system's separation of powers and the attendant roles of the three branches. In
brief, and calling a spade a spade, the Court legislated-afunction
in this instance demonstrably reserved to the legislature (Congress).
The elusive line between "judging" and "legislating" is, to repeat,
of course a monumentally difficult one to draw in a great many
instances, and it represents the basic issue of controversy in the
exercise of judicial power. But there is no controversy in the present
instance: Congress spoke and wrote with uncharacteristic clarity!
Nonetheless, a majority of five Supreme Court Justices, given the
nature of the public policy issue at hand, would neither listen nor
read accurately.
V.
A concluding word on the desirability of "reverse discrimination"
per se. I hope I have demonstrated what I regard as its tenets; what
54. Letter to author, July 7, 1979.
55. 99 S. Ct. at 2734 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

1980]

"REVERSE DISCRIMINATION"

it is, and what it is not. Whether or not one agrees with that position, and regardless of how one perceives or reads the inherent statutory and constitutional issues, what of the merits of the proposition
of racial, or sexual, or religious, or nationality quotas, or by whatever other noun they may be perfumed? It is not easy to do for
me-as my students and colleagues would testify-but I will endeavor to be brief: I shall call as my star witness upon someone
whose credentials on the libertarian front are indisputably impeccable, Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas. In his dissenting opinion in De
Funis v. Odegaard, after finding that Marco De Funis had been
rejected by the University of Washington School of Law "solely on
account of his race," 6 the justice lectured at length on that classification, styling it at the outset as introducing "a capricious and
irrelevant factor working an invidious discrimination,"57 and insisting that the Constitution and the laws of our land demand that each
application for admission must be considered in a "racially neutral
way,"5" a phrase he italicized and one, incidentally, quoted with
approval by Mr. Justice Powell in Bakke. 59 "Minorities in our midst
who are to serve actively in our public affairs," he went on, "should
be chosen on talent and character alone, not on cultural orientation
or leanings." Warmly he cautioned that
[t]here is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred ....
A De Funis who is white is entitled to no advantage by reason of that
fact; nor is he subject to any disability, no matter what his race or
color. Whatever his race, he had a constitutional right to have his
application considered on its individual merits in a racially neutral
manner."'
...So far as race is concerned, any state sponsored preference of
one race over another in that competition is in my view "invidious"
and violative of the Equal Protection Clause.2
Mr. Justice Douglas concluded on a note that, for me, hits the
56. 416 U.S. at 333 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

57. Id.
58. Id. at 334.
59. 438 U.S. at 298.
60. 416 U.S. at 334.

61. Id. at 336-37.
62. Id. at 343-44.
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essence of the entire issue: "The Equal Protection Clause," he insisted,
commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation in
order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized.
The purpose of the University of Washington cannot be to produce
black lawyers for blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jewish lawyers for
Jews, Irish lawyers for the Irish. It should be to produce good lawyers
for Americans .... 63
That, I submit in all humility, is the sine qua non of the matter.
It is my fervent hope, though far from a confident expectation-especially given the unsatisfactory, multi-faceted, evasioninviting response given by the Court in Bakke-that we will still,
at this late hour, resolve to heed the now retired Justice's admonition and substitute for "lawyers" whatever educational, occupational, or professional noun may be appropriate in given circumstances in the justly egalitarian strivings of all Americans, regardless of race, sex, creed, age, nationality, or religion, for a dignified,
happy, prosperous, and free life, blessed by a resolute commitment
to, and acquiescence in, equal justice under law-which is as the
cement of society.

63. Id. at 342.
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